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Abstract
We propose in this paper a policies similarity approach which is performed in three steps. The
first step is concerned with the formalization of a XACML policy as a term in a boolean algebra
while taking into account the policy and rule combining algorithms. This formalization is based
on Security Policy Language (SePL) which was proposed in a previous work. In the second
step, the SePL term is transformed into a term in a boolean ring. In the third step, the two
policy terms, which are derived from the previous step, are the input to a rewriting system
to conclude which kind of relation exists between these security policies such as equivalence,
restriction, inclusion, and divergence. We provide a case study of our approach based on real
XACML policies and also an empirical evaluation of its performance.
Keywords: Security Policies; Similarity; Rewriting; XACML.
1. Introduction
Standard security policy languages are designed for the sake of creating a common back-
ground for providers to define their security constraints. A paramount benefit from such stan-
dardization is interoperability between different systems. Generally, the proposed security
languages come with an informal syntax and semantics, which makes the learning curve of
such languages high. One of these languages is eXtensible Access Control Markup Language
(XACML) [20]. It is a standard XML based language that can be used in the definition of Web
service policies. XACML comes with a set of combining algorithms that allow the integration
of different security policies. This language is not endowed with a formal semantics and its
combining algorithms are not formalized. Therefore, such famous standard language lacks a
formal basis that allows to reason about security policies. For instance, the consistency of se-
curity policies can be established. One of the critical issue in reasoning about security policies
is the similarity between security policies. Often, we need to know if a certain security policy
is equivalent or not to another one to be sure that we don’t have any conflict between policies.
Such assessment can be done only if a rigorous formal framework is designed to capture the
informal semantics of security policy languages such as XACML. Accordingly, we provided
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in a previous work [17] a fully-fledge, compact and formal language called the Security Policy
Language (SePL) to define formally security policies. The syntax of SePL includes several
operators for the integration of policies and it is endowed with a denotational semantics that
is a generic semantics, i.e., which is independent of any evaluation environment. We proved
the completeness of SePL with respect to sets theory. Based on the elaborated semantics, we
proposed a formalization of a subset of XACML 3.0. Furthermore, we provided a semantics for
XACML policy combining algorithms. We build in this paper on top of the elaborated formal
framework for security policies to reason about the similarity of security policies. Our policies
similarity approach is performed in three steps. The first step is concerned with the formaliza-
tion of a XACML policy as a term in a boolean algebra while taking into account the policy
and rule combining algorithms. This formalization is based on SePL. In the second step, the
SePL term is transformed into a term in a boolean ring. In the third step, the two policy terms,
derived from the previous step, will be the input to a rewriting system to conclude which kind
of relation exists between these security policies such as equivalence, restriction, inclusion, and
divergence. We provide a case study of our approach on real XACML policies and also an
empirical evaluation of its performance. The contributions of this work are as follows:
• The design of a transformation of XACML policies into semantic terms in a boolean ring.
• The proposal of a rewriting system for security policies that allows to establish the simi-
larity between their semantic terms.
• The evaluation of the proposed technique.
The rest of the paper is divided as follows. In Section 2, we discuss the related work regard-
ing policies similarity. Section 3 is dedicated to the presentation of the proposed approach. In
Section 4, we present the mapping of XACML policies into terms of a boolean ring. Section 5
is devoted to the presentation of the proposed similarity algorithm. In section 6, we provide an
experimental evaluation of the similarity algorithm. Some concluding remarks and future work
are provided in Section 7. All the details regarding SePL syntax and semantics are provided in
the Appendix.
2. Related Work
Policies integration is a paramount issue for service providers. An important step in such
integration is to analyze the similarity of the policies. Unfortunately, this problem was not
deeply investigated and only a few approaches were proposed. We review in what follows these
initiatives and pinpoint their contributions and limitations.
Exam [15] is a complete environment for the analysis and management of access control
policies. It supports the acquisition, search, analysis of similarity, and integration of security
policies. This method uses the Multiple Terminal Binary Decision Diagram (MTBDD) as a
representation of a policy. The MTBDD of a security policy is an acyclic directed graph whose
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Figure 2.1: Policy MTBDD
internal nodes represent boolean predicates that correspond to: S (subject), A (action), R (re-
source), C (condition), and the components of a policy in which the terminals can be one of
{permit, deny, not applicable} representing the effect of the policy on requests. In such diagram,
the paths represent the rules of a policy. The MTBDDs of different policies are then combined
to derive a single MTBDD in which each terminal corresponds to a n-tuple < e1, e2, . . . , en >
that represents the effect of the policy on all requests. By browsing the paths leading to the
terminals of the combined MTBDD, we can extract the set of the requests which have common
or different authorizations in a given set of policies. Also, we can deduce all the requests autho-
rized by the policies by browsing all the paths that lead to the terminal < Permit, Permit >
in the combined MTBDD. For example, imagine a scenario where a patient wishes to transfer
his medical records from hospital X to hospital Y each of which has its own policy, P1 and P2
respectively. The policy P1 allows access to medical records if the patient has given his consent
and if the subject who needs to access is either a nurse or a doctor. The policy P2 allows access
to medical records if the patient has given his consent or a surgical intervention is planned and
if the subject is either a surgeon or a nurse. Before transferring the medical records, the patient
must ensure that the security policy of hospital Y offers the same level of security as that of
hospital X . An analysis of similarity between P1 and P2 can be used to ensure such a require-
ment. Figure 2.1 shows the MTBDDs corresponding to P1, P2 and their combination. Indeed,
the paths to the terminal P − P in the combined MTBDD pinpoint the similarity between the
two policies, whereas the remaining paths show their differences. The patient may use this
information before deciding to transfer his medical records. Although this approach is precise,
the computation is very intensive and it is not valid for a set of security policies (PolicySet).
Margrave [6] contains, in addition to the verification component of properties, a system for
the analysis of impact change. It considers two policies and summarizes the differences between
them. Margrave allows to represent the security policies in the form of trees using the same pro-
cedure as the tree that is manipulated by EXAM. The tree resulting from this combination can
be further analyzed and verified, with the tool Margrave as described in [6]. Margrave defines
a diagram of decision called a decision diagram of analysis change or a Common Multiple Ter-
minal Binary Decision Diagram (CMTBDD) whose representation shows the combinations of
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changes occurring between the policies as well as the differences between them. This tool has
the disadvantage of not being able to model the structures of different specification languages
of security policies and is limited to Ponder and XACML languages in addition to the difficulty
results analysis for complex specifications.
A policy score calculation approach is proposed in [14]. The similarity measure of the
proposed policy is based on the comparison of each pair of components of the corresponding
policies. In fact, the measure of similarity of two policies consists in assigning a score of
similarity which relies on the relationship between the sets of allowed requests (denied) by the
two policies. The score of similarity is a value between 0 and 1. For example, in a scenario
where a series of requests allowed (denied) by a policy P1 is a subset of requests permitted
(denied) by P2, the score of similarity of policies P1 and P2 must be higher than the score
assigned to a scenario in which the whole set of the authorized requests (denied) by P1 and P2
have a few or no requests in common. We are going to present now how to get the score of
similarity of two policies. Given two policies P1 and P2, the rules of these policies are first
grouped according to their effects, which results in a set of rules Permit (note PR) and a set of
rules Deny (note DR). Each rule in P1 is then compared to a rule in P2 which has the same
effect, and a score Srule is then obtained which is in fact the sum of the similarity scores of the
elements constituting the rules as shown in Figure 2.2. Then, based on Srule , one-many mapping
functions Φ for each rule in the two policies are calculated. Using Φ, the score of the entire rule
is calculated. Finally, the score of overall similarity between P1 and P2 is obtained (see Figure
2.3). The similarity between the policies depends on the score. Although this approach cannot
be used to enumerate the differences between the policies according to specific requests, it can
be used as a method of quick filtering to prune the dissimilar policies before the use of analyzers
of similarity which are more precise and computing-intensive. This is particularly useful when
a large number of policies have to be compared.
Mazzoleni et al. [16] propose a process to calculate the similarity between two XACML
policies. The process includes three stages:
• The similarity is calculated between the rules taking into account only their Target and
Condition: the first step is to calculate the similarity between pairs of rules defined
using the same attributes of a policy. The objective is to identify, for each attribute,
the policy that specifies the most restrictive condition. To obtain this information, this
method performs an analysis of the conditions of the two rules and according to the data
types and functions, it extracts and compares the sets of values.
• The similarities of rules are grouped and simplified by taking into account their effects:
after computing the similarities, some transformation functions are applied with a certain
logic in order to reduce the number of similarities of rules. The goal of this step is to
obtain only two values of similarity; one for the rules whose effect is “Deny" and the
other for the rules defined with “Permit" as effect.
• The similarity of policies is extracted using the rule combining algorithms specified by
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Figure 2.2: Srule computation process
Figure 2.3: Global score computation
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the two policies: let Pm and Pn be two policies and i, j ∈ {Converge, Diverge, Restrict,
Extend, Shuffle} be two values of similarity. If Pm specifies “Permit-overrides" and
Pn specifies “Deny-overrides" as their rule combining algorithms, then the similarity
between the policies Pm and Pn is calculated as follows:
– {RPermitConverge,Extend, R
Deny
i } = Extend,
– { RPermitDiverge, R
Deny
i } = Diverge,
– {RPermitRestrict, Shuffle,R
Deny
i } = Shuffle.
In addition, if Pm specifies “Deny-overrides" and Pn specifies “Permit-overrides" as the
rule combining algorithms, then the similarity between the policies Pm and Pn is as follows:
• {RPermitConverge,Extend, RDenyi } = Restrict,
• { RPermitDiverge, RDenyi } = Diverge,
• {RPermitRestrict,Shuffle, RDenyi } = Shuffle.
This method of calculating similarity of policies is limited to policies having the same at-
tribute. Similarly, it is not valid for a set of security policies (PolicySet) and handles only two
combining algorithms: “Permit-overrides" and “Deny- overrides" of the entire set of rule com-
bining algorithms described in XACML. In [2], Backes et al. propose an algorithm to verify the
refinement of business confidentiality policies. The concept of policy refinement is close to the
similarity of the policies in a certain sense, because this method checks if a policy is a subset
of the other. However, their study is based on EPAL rather than XACML. It is an important
difference, because the sole rule combining algorithm that is considered in their work is the
First-one-applicable.
Lately, Jebbaoui et al. [10] devised a new set-based language called SBA-XACML to cap-
ture the complex structures in XACML and endowed it with a semantics to detect access flaws,
conflicts and redundancies between policies. Their work covers the well-known rules combin-
ing algorithms (e.g. Permit overrides and First Applicable). However, the semantic space lacks
a distance to assess the similarity between rules.
3. Description of the approach
In this section, we focus on the similarity of XACML policies. Given two policies P1 and
P2, the process involves two steps namely:
• Step 1: The first step is concerned with the formalization of a XACML policy as a boolean
expression while taking into account the policy and rule combining algorithms. This
formalization is based on a new compact and formal security language called Security
Policy Language (SePL).
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• Step 2: The two policy representations, which are derived from the previous step, are the
input to a rewriting system to conclude which kind of relation exist between two security
policies such as equivalence, restriction, inclusion, and divergence.
More precisely, we are interested in comparing security policies to know whether one is
equivalent to another, greater or smaller than another, disjoint from another, etc. To this end,
we proceed according to the following steps :
1. We transform every XACML property to an SePL formula.
2. We transform every SePL formula to a boolean expression. More precisely, the semantics
of SePL formulae are transformed to terms in a boolean ring.
3. We generate a theorem prover from the axioms of boolean ring. This theorem prover is a
confluent an convergent rewriting system that transform every tautology to the term 1.
4. We transform our question to a tautology checking query. For example, to prove whether
a security policy P1 is included in P2, we simply use the rewriting system to check
whether the boolean ring term corresponding to P1 ⇒ P2 could be rewritten to 1.
The Security Policy Language (SePL) [17] is a formal and compact language for expressing
security policies. All the details about the syntax and semantics of SePL are provided in the
appendix.
4. XACML Security Policy Analysis
In this section, we show how we can make some formal analysis related to security proper-
ties. The steps that are aforementioned in the previous section are detailed in what follows.
4.1. From XACML to SePL
The transformation from a XACML policy into a SePL term then to an algebraic semantic
term was done in a previous work that we summarize in the Appendix. Here, we give an
example of two XACML policies that illustrate such transformation and which we consider in
the remaining steps of the current work. The first policy P is composed of two rules. The first
one states that Alice and Bob do not have the right to write in the file “secret.txt". The second
one states that any action can be performed by any subject on the file “secret.txt". The two rules
are combined using the first applicable algorithm. The XACML specification of P is provided
in Table 1.
The second policy Q contains two rules, the first one states that Alice and Bob don’t have
the right to write in the file "secret.txt". The second rules states that Alice does not have the
right to write in that "secret.txt" file. The two rules are combined using the First-Applicable
algorithm. The XACML specification of Q is provided in Tables 2 and 3.
The formalization of the aforementioned policies in SePL is as follows.
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Table 1: XACML Policy P
<Policy xmlns="urn:oasis:names:tc:xacml:3.0:core:schema:wd-17"
xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance"
xsi:schemaLocation="urn:oasis:names:tc:xacml:3.0:core:schema:wd-17
http://docs.oasis-open.org/xacml/3.0/xacml-core-v3-schema-wd-17.xsd"
PolicyId="urn:oasis:names:tc:xacml:3.0:example:SimplePolicy1" Version="1.0"
RuleCombiningAlgId="urn:oasis:names:tc:xacml:1.0:rule-combining-algorithm:first-applicable">
<Target>
<AnyOf>
<AllOf>
<Match MatchId="urn:oasis:names:tc:xacml:1.0:function:String-equal">
<AttributeValue DataType="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema]string">
secret.txt</AttributeValue> <AttributeDesignator MustBePresent="false"
Category="urn:oasis:names:tc:xacml:1.0:subject-category:access-686 subject"
AttributeId="urn:oasis:names:tc:xacml:2.0:resource:resource-id"
DataType="urn:oasis:names:tc:xacml:1.0:data-type:rfc822Name"/>
</Match>
</AllOf>
</AnyOf>
</Target>
<Rule RuleId="urn:oasis:names:tc:xacml:3.0:example:SimpleRule1" Effect="Deny">
<Target>
<AnyOf>
<AllOf>
<Match MatchId="urn:oasis:names:tc:xacml:1.0:function:String-equal">
<AttributeValue DataType="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema]string">
write</AttributeValue> <AttributeDesignator MustBePresent="false"
Category="urn:oasis:names:tc:xacml:1.0:action-category:access-686 subject"
AttributeId="urn:oasis:names:tc:xacml:2.0:action:action-id"
DataType="urn:oasis:names:tc:xacml:1.0:data-type:rfc822Name"/>
</Match>
</AllOf>
</AnyOf>
<AnyOf>
<AllOf>
<Match MatchId="urn:oasis:names:tc:xacml:1.0:function:string-at-least">
<AttributeValue DataType="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema]string">
Alice</AttributeValue> <AttributeDesignator MustBePresent="false"
Category="urn:oasis:names:tc:xacml:1.0:subject-category:access- subject"
AttributeId="urn:oasis:names:tc:xacml:2.0:subject:subject-id"
DataType="urn:oasis:names:tc:xacml:1.0:data-type:rfc822Name"/>
</Match>
<Match MatchId="urn:oasis:names:tc:xacml:1.0:function:string-at-least">
<AttributeValue DataType="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema]string">
Bob</AttributeValue> <AttributeDesignator MustBePresent="false"
Category="urn:oasis:names:tc:xacml:1.0:subject-category:access-686 subject"
AttributeId="urn:oasis:names:tc:xacml:2.0:subject:subject-id"
DataType="urn:oasis:names:tc:xacml:1.0:data-type:rfc822Name"/>
</Match>
</AllOf>
</AnyOf>
</Target>
</Rule>
<Rule RuleId="urn:oasis:names:tc:xacml:3.0:example:SimpleRule2" Effect="Permit"/>
</Policy>
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Table 2: XACML Policy Q (Part I)
<Policy xmlns="urn:oasis:names:tc:xacml:3.0:core:schema:wd-17"
xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance"
xsi:schemaLocation="urn:oasis:names:tc:xacml:3.0:core:schema:wd-17
http://docs.oasis-open.org/xacml/3.0/xacml-core-v3-schema-wd-17.xsd"
PolicyId="urn:oasis:names:tc:xacml:3.0:example:SimplePolicy2" Version="1.0"
RuleCombiningAlgId="urn:oasis:names:tc:xacml:1.0:rule-combining-algorithm:first-applicable">
<Target>
<AnyOf>
<AllOf>
<Match MatchId="urn:oasis:names:tc:xacml:1.0:function:String-equal">
<AttributeValue DataType="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema]string">
secret.txt</AttributeValue> <AttributeDesignator MustBePresent="false"
Category="urn:oasis:names:tc:xacml:1.0:subject-category:access-686 subject"
AttributeId="urn:oasis:names:tc:xacml:2.0:resource:resource-id"
DataType="urn:oasis:names:tc:xacml:1.0:data-type:rfc822Name"/>
</Match>
</AllOf>
</AnyOf>
</Target>
<Rule RuleId="urn:oasis:names:tc:xacml:3.0:example:SimpleRule1" Effect="Deny">
<Target>
<AnyOf>
<AllOf>
<Match MatchId="urn:oasis:names:tc:xacml:1.0:function:String-equal">
<AttributeValue DataType="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema]string">
write</AttributeValue> <AttributeDesignator MustBePresent="false"
Category="urn:oasis:names:tc:xacml:1.0:action-category:access-686 subject"
AttributeId="urn:oasis:names:tc:xacml:2.0:action:action-id"
DataType="urn:oasis:names:tc:xacml:1.0:data-type:rfc822Name"/>
</Match>
</AllOf>
</AnyOf>
<AnyOf>
<AllOf>
<Match MatchId="urn:oasis:names:tc:xacml:1.0:function:string-at-least">
<AttributeValue DataType="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema]string">
Alice</AttributeValue> <AttributeDesignator MustBePresent="false"
Category="urn:oasis:names:tc:xacml:1.0:subject-category:access- subject"
AttributeId="urn:oasis:names:tc:xacml:2.0:subject:subject-id"
DataType="urn:oasis:names:tc:xacml:1.0:data-type:rfc822Name"/>
</Match>
<Match MatchId="urn:oasis:names:tc:xacml:1.0:function:string-at-least">
<AttributeValue DataType="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema]string">
Bob</AttributeValue> <AttributeDesignator MustBePresent="false"
Category="urn:oasis:names:tc:xacml:1.0:subject-category:access-686 subject"
AttributeId="urn:oasis:names:tc:xacml:2.0:subject:subject-id"
DataType="urn:oasis:names:tc:xacml:1.0:data-type:rfc822Name"/>
</Match>
</AllOf>
</AnyOf>
</Target>
</Rule>
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Table 3: XACML Policy Q (Part II)
<Rule RuleId="urn:oasis:names:tc:xacml:3.0:example:SimpleRule2" Effect="Permit">
<Target>
<AnyOf>
<AllOf>
<Match MatchId="urn:oasis:names:tc:xacml:1.0:function:String-equal">
<AttributeValue DataType="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema]string">
write</AttributeValue> <AttributeDesignator MustBePresent="false"
Category="urn:oasis:names:tc:xacml:1.0:action-category:access-686 subject"
AttributeId="urn:oasis:names:tc:xacml:2.0:action:action-id"
DataType="urn:oasis:names:tc:xacml:1.0:data-type:rfc822Name"/>
</Match>
<Match MatchId="urn:oasis:names:tc:xacml:1.0:function:string-at-least">
<AttributeValue DataType="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema]string">
Alice</AttributeValue> <AttributeDesignator MustBePresent="false"
Category="urn:oasis:names:tc:xacml:1.0:subject-category:access- subject"
AttributeId="urn:oasis:names:tc:xacml:2.0:subject:subject-id"
DataType="urn:oasis:names:tc:xacml:1.0:data-type:rfc822Name"/>
</Match>
</AllOf>
</AnyOf>
</Target>
</Rule>
</Policy>
• For the first policy P , we have P = FA(φ : (P1, P2))
where
φ = (x)
P1 = (y, z)→ d
P2 = ()→ p
x = string-equal(AttResource, secret.txt)
y = string-equal(AttAction,write)
z = string-at-least(AttSubject, Alice) or
string-at-least(AttSubject, Bob)
– From abbreviation 2 (Section 7.3), it follows:
P1 = (⊥, (y, z))
P2 = ((),⊥)
– By abbreviation 2 (Section 7.3), it follows:
P = FA(φ : (P1, P2)) = FA((⊥, (x, y, z)), ((x),⊥))
– From the definition of FA, it follows:
P = ((⊥, (x, y, z)).((x),⊥)
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• For the second policy Q, we have: Q = FA(φ : (Q1, Q2))
where
φ = (x)
Q1 = (y, z)→ d
Q2 = (y, u)→ p
x = string-equal(AttResource, secret.txt)
y = string-equal(AttAction,write)
z = string-at-least(AttSubject, Alice) or
string-at-least(AttSubject, Bob)
u = string-at-least(AttSubject, Alice)
As we did for P , using the shortcuts of Section 7.3, it follows that:
Q = ((⊥, (x, y, z)).((x, y, u),⊥)
4.2. From SePL to Boolean Ring
Based on the semantics of SePL, we transform a policy in SePL to a tuple of terms in the
boolean ring. For our purpose, the boolean-ring formalism is more interesting than the boolean
algebra since its axioms define a unique normal form (up to associativity and commutativity of
the two operators) which is a key feature for building a theorem prover. However, there is an
intrinsic link between boolean algebra and boolean ring as shown hereafter.
• From each boolean ring, we can construct a boolean algebra:
If (B, ⊕, ∗, 0, 1) is a boolean ring, then (B, ∨, ∧, ¬, 0, 1) is a boolean algebra such that
∨, ∧, ¬ are defined as shown in Table 4.
x ∨ y = x⊕ y ⊕ x ∗ y
x ∧ y = x ∗ y
¬x = x⊕ 1
Table 4: From Rings to Algebra
• Inversely, from a boolean algebra we can construct a boolean ring:
If (B, ∨, ∧, ¬, 0, 1) is a boolean algebra, then (B, ⊕, ∗, 0, 1) is a boolean ring such that
⊕ and ∗ are defined in Table 5.
x⊕ y = (x ∧ ¬y) ∨ (¬x ∧ y)
x ∗ y = x ∧ y
Table 5: From Algebra to Rings
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The semantics of SePL transforms a security policy to a tuple of terms in the boolean al-
gebra. We use the link between boolean ring and boolean algebra to transform the seman-
tic term into a term in boolean Ring. If we have many policies, we should make sure that
variables involved in terms are completely disjoint. For instance, if the variable x means
subject − id = {Alice} and y means subject − id = {Alice,Bob}, then we should cre-
ate a new variable z that is equal to subject− id = {Bob} and substitute y by x ∨ z to obtain
disjoint variables.
Example. Let us continue with our previous example. We already transformed P and Q for
XACML to SePL and we obtained:
• P = ((⊥, (x, y, z)).((x),⊥)
• Q = ((⊥, (x, y, z)).((x, y, u),⊥)
where
x = string-equal(AttResource, secret.txt)
y = string-equal(AttAction,write)
z = string-at-least(AttSubject, Alice) or
string-at-least(AttSubject, Bob)
u = string-at-least(AttSubject, Alice)
We observe that the variables z and u are not disjoint. To make them disjoint, we create a
new variable w = string-at-least(AttSubject, Bob) and we substitute z by u ∨ w. Then, we
obtain:
P = ((⊥, (x, y, u or w)).((x),⊥)
Q = ((⊥, (x, y, u or w)).((x, y, u),⊥)
Using the definition of semantics, we obtain:
[[P ]] = (F3 ∨ ((x,T,T)− (x, y, u ∨ w)), (x, y, u ∨ w) ∨ (F3 − F3))
[[Q]] = (F3 ∨ ((x, y, u)− (x, y, u ∨ w)), (x, y, u ∨ w) ∨ (F3 − F3))
where Fn, n ∈ N+, is an abbreviation of (F, . . . ,F)︸ ︷︷ ︸
n
, (e.g., F3 = (F,F,F)).
Now, we have tuples of boolean terms that we can use as input to the theorem prover.
4.3. Theorem Prover
The theorem prover is a confluent and terminating rewrite system build mainly from the ax-
ioms of a boolean ring. Contrarily to a boolean algebra, a boolean ring defines a unique normal
form, up to associativity and commutativity of the two operators, for every term. Tautologies
reduce all the the time to 1, contradictions to 0, and formulae that can be satisfied under some
conditions are reduced to neither.
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Table 6: Main Inference rules
F → 0 R0
T → 1 R1
x− y → x⊕ x ∗ y R2
x ∨ y → x ∗ y ⊕ x⊕ y R3
x ∧ y → x ∗ y R4
x =⇒ y → x ∗ y ⊕ x⊕ 1 R5
x ≈ y → x⊕ y ⊕ 1 R6
¬x → x⊕ 1 R7
x⊕ 0 → x R8
x⊕ x → 0 R9
x ∗ 1 → x R10
x ∗ x → x R11
x ∗ 0 → 0 R12
x ∗ (y ⊕ z) → x ∗ y ⊕ x ∗ z R13
The main rules of our theorem prover are given in Table 6. Rules R0, . . . , R1 transform
boolean expressions returned by our semantics to terms in the boolean ring. Rules R8, . . . , R13
are axioms of the boolean ring.
We extend the aforementioned rewriting rules to deal with a n-tuple by new ones given by
Table 7.
Table 7: Rules Extension
Fn → (F, . . . ,F) T0
Tn → (T, . . . ,T) T1
(x1, . . . , xn)− (y1, . . . , yn) → (x1 − y1, . . . , xn − yn) T2
(x1, . . . , xn) ∨ (y1, . . . , yn) → (x1 ∨ y1, . . . , xn ∨ yn) T3
(x1, . . . , xn) ∧ (y1, . . . , yn) → (x1 ∧ y1, . . . , xn ∧ yn) T4
(x1, . . . , xn) =⇒ (y1, . . . , yn) → (x1 =⇒ y1, . . . , xn =⇒ yn) T5
(x1, . . . , xn) ≈ (y1, . . . , yn) → (x1 ≈ y1, . . . , xn ≈ yn) T6
¬(x1, . . . , xn) → (¬x1, . . . ,¬xn) T7
(x1, . . . , 0, . . . , xn) → 0 T8
(1, . . . , 1) → 1 T9
The previous rules should be applied under commutativity and associativity of ∗ and ⊕, i.e:
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Commutativity x⊕ y = y ⊕ x
x ∗ y = y ∗ x
Associativity (x⊕ y)⊕ z = x⊕ (y ⊕ z)
(x ∗ y) ∗ z = x ∗ (y ∗ z)
4.4. Queries and proofs
Our query should be transformed to a tautology test in a boolean ring or a boolean algebra.
Since, we are interested into comparing security policies, we can easily transform different kind
of queries to tautology tests as shown in Table 8 .
Example. Let us continue with our previous example. We have :
[[P ]] = (F3 ∨ ((x,T,T)− (x, y, u ∨ w)), (x, y, u ∨ w) ∨ (F3 − F3))
[[Q]] = (F3 ∨ ((x, y, u)− (x, y, u ∨ w)), (x, y, u ∨ w) ∨ (F3 − F3))
Suppose that we want to check whether P is equivalent to Q or not. Our query is P ≈ Q.
P ≈ Q if

F3 ∨ ((x,T,T)− (x, y, u ∨ w)) ≈ F3 ∨ ((x, y, u)− (x, y, u ∨ w))
and
(x, y, u ∨ w) ∨ (F3 − F3) ≈ (x, y, u ∨ w) ∨ (F3 − F3)
The second equivalence is trivial. Let us prove the first one using the inference system:
F3 ∨ ((x,T,T)− (x, y, u ∨ w)) ≈ F3 ∨ ((x, y, u)− (x, y, u ∨ w))
By Applying T0 and R0, we get
→ (0, 0, 0) ∨ ((x,T,T)− (x, y, u ∨ w)) ≈ (0, 0, 0) ∨ ((x, y, u)− (x, y, u ∨ w))
By Applying T1
→ (0, 0, 0) ∨ ((x, 1, 1)− (x, y, u ∨ w)) ≈ (0, 0, 0) ∨ ((x, y, u)− (x, y, u ∨ v))
By Applying T2
→ (0, 0, 0) ∨ (x− x, 1− y, 1− (u ∨ w)) ≈ (0, 0, 0) ∨ (x− x, y − y, u− (u ∨ w))
By Applying R2
→ (0, 0, 0) ∨ (x⊕ x ∗ x, 1− y, 1− (u ∨ w)) ≈ (0, 0, 0) ∨ (x⊕ x ∗ x, y − y, u− (u ∨ w))
By Applying R11
→ (0, 0, 0) ∨ (x⊕ x, 1− y, 1− (u ∨ w)) ≈ (0, 0, 0) ∨ (x⊕ x, y − y, u− (u ∨ w))
By Applying R9
→ (0, 0, 0) ∨ (0, 1− y, 1− (u ∨ w)) ≈ (0, 0, 0) ∨ (0, y − y, u− (u ∨ w))
Appliquons T8
→ (0, 0, 0) ∨ (0, 0, 0) ≈ (0, 0, 0) ∨ (0, 0, 0)
By Applying R3
→ (0 ∗ 0⊕ 0⊕ 0, 0 ∗ 0⊕ 0⊕ 0, 0 ∗ 0⊕ 0⊕ 0) ≈ (0 ∗ 0⊕ 0⊕ 0, 0 ∗ 0⊕ 0⊕ 0, 0 ∗ 0⊕ 0⊕ 0)
By Applying R12
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Table 8: Comparing Security Policies
Case Figure Term to prove
P1 converges P2 P1 ≈ P2
P1 extends P2 (P1 ⇒ P2) ∧ ¬(P2 ⇒ P2)
P1 restricts P2 (P2 ⇒ P1) ∧ ¬(P1 ⇒ P2)
P1 shuffles P2 ¬(P1 ⊕ P2) ∧ ¬(P2 ⇒ P1) ∧ ¬(P1 ⇒ P2)
P1 diverges P2 P1 ⊕ P2
→ (0⊕ 0⊕ 0, 0⊕ 0⊕ 0, 0⊕ 0⊕ 0) ≈ (0⊕ 0⊕ 0, 0⊕ 0⊕ 0, 0⊕ 0⊕ 0)
By Applying R8
→ (0, 0, 0) ≈ (0, 0, 0)
By Applying T6
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→ (0 ≈ 0, 0 ≈ 0, 0 ≈ 0)
By Applying R6
→ (0⊕ 0⊕ 1, 0⊕ 0⊕ 1, 0⊕ 0⊕ 1)
By Applying R8
→ (1, 1, 1)
By Applying T9
→ 1
Finally, we conclude that the two policies are equivalent.
5. Policies Similarity Algorithm
We present in this section our policies similarity algorithm (Algorithm 1). The algorithm
takes as input two XACML policies, transforms them into SePL terms based on the function
d − e that is presented in Table 7.4. The semantics function [[ ]] transforms the SePL terms
into terms of a boolean algebra, which are mapped into terms of a boolean ring using the
transformation described in Section 5. These terms are the input to the theorem prover to
deduce the similarity type (Converge, Diverge, Extend, Shuffle) between the two policies.
Algorithm 1 Policies Similarity Algorithm
Require: XACML policies XP1 and XP2
Ensure: Policy similarity type
SPi = d XPi e . d − e is the transformation from a XACML policy to a SePL term as
presented in Table 7.4
SPi = [[Pi]] . [[Pi]] denotes the semantics of the policy Pi, which is a term in a boolean
algebra
BPi = B(SPi) . B denotes the transformation of a term in an algebra to a boolean ring as
early explained in Table 5
SimType = "Converge" if BP1 ≈ BP2
SimType = "Diverge" if BP1 ⊕ BP2
SimType = "Restrict" if BP2 =⇒ BP1) ∧ ¬( BP1 =⇒ BP2)
SimType = "Extend" if BP1 =⇒ BP2) ∧ ¬( BP2 =⇒ BP1)
SimType = "Shuffle" if BP1 ⊕ BP2) ∧ ¬ ( BP1 =⇒ BP2) ∧ ¬ ( BP2 =⇒ BP1)
return SimType
The worst case time complexity of the transformation algorithms is O(m), where m is the
number of rules. The complexity of the policies similarity algorithm is O(n ×m), where n is
the number of policies. So our complexity is not exponential, which shows that our algorithm
has a reasonable complexity.
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6. Experimental Evaluation
To analyze the performance of the policies similarity process, we developed a prototype
using Java and XACML. More precisely, we used Tom; a pre-compiler that enables us to imple-
ment our rewriting system and transformation rules. Figure 6.1 shows the interface of policies
similarity that we have implemented as part of the whole tool.
Figure 6.1: Policy similarity interface
We present evaluate the performance of our policies similarity algorithm.
6.1. Performance analysis
To evaluate our approach, we developed a tool that generates XACML policies with a ran-
dom number of rules. The experiments presented in this section are performed 10 times on a
machine Core i5, 2.30 Ghz, 4 Go of RAM with a Windows 7 OS. The average of the obtained
results is then computed.
We first do the experiments for the evaluation of our rewriting system, which translates a
XACML policy into a boolean expression. The figure below shows the performance of the sys-
tem for each type of similarity. The trends of the five curves are almost the same. Furthermore,
the curves are linear with respect to the number of rules in a policy.
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6.1.1. Preprocessing time
We evaluate here the time required to rewrite a policy as a term in a boolean ring for a pair
of policies. The average number of parameters (resource, action et subject) varies between 20
et 100 for each policy and the number of rules varies between 8 and 32. The preprocessing time
is linear with respect to the number of rules and parameters. More precisely, if each policy has
32 rules and 100 parameters, the preprocessing time is 90% the global response time. Hence,
the global similarity response time is dominated by the preprocessing module.
6.1.2. Response time
We evaluate now the total time for policies similarity. The figure below shows the time
variation while increasing the number of compared policies.
Knowing that the number of pairs is generally between 20 and 100 [15], our approach has a
reasonable response time. Another experiment is done by fixing the number of elements in each
policy and varying the number of policy pairs to be compared. The policies have 10 parameters
in average. We did the experiment for 8 to 16 rules.
We observe that the time required to compare few hundred of policies is few seconds. The
minimal response time is 1s and the maximal is 1m. This shows the feasibility and scalability
of our approach.
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7. Conclusion and future work
We presented a new approach for the assessment of policies similarity that is based on a
rewriting system. Each policy is formalized as SePL expression then mapped into a term in a
boolean ring based on pre-defined transformation rules. We presented a case study, which shows
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how to compare two XACML policies based on our approach. We provided also a complexity
and performance analysis of our global algorithm. Our future work will be oriented towards
the optimization of the proposed approach and its extension to deal with more rule combining
algorithms.
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Appendix
7.1. Syntax
We present in this Section a new security policy language (SePL) that is compact and ex-
pressive. This language is generic and is meant to be used to perform security policy integration.
The syntax of SePL is given by the following BNF grammar:
P,P1,P2 ::= ε | 0 | 1 | R | ¬P | pP | P1 · P2
| P1TP2 | P1UP2 | P1 ‖ P2
| P1 + P2 | P1 − P2 | P1 	 P2
R ::= < ϕ1, ϕ2 >
where
• ε denotes the empty policy.
• 0 denotes the policy that denies all actions.
• 1 denotes the policy that accepts all actions.
• R =< ϕ1, ϕ2 > denotes the policy that accepts actions accepted by ϕ1 and not denied by
ϕ2 and denies actions denied by ϕ2 and not accepted by ϕ1.
• ¬P denotes the policy that accepts actions that P denies and denies actions that P ac-
cepts.
• pP behaves like P except that it transforms the indeterminate part of P to not applicable.
In other words, if the accept part or the deny part of P is indeterminate, it becomes an
empty set.
• P1 · P2 denotes the sequential composition of policies. This gives the result of the first
one applicable. If no one is applicable, the result is either not applicable or indeterminate
if P1 and P2 are indeterminate.
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• P1TP2 denotes the policy that gives priority to accept, i.e, it accepts an action when P1
or P2 accepts it and denies an action when no one of them accepts it and at least one of
them denies it. Otherwise, the policy is either not applicable or indeterminate if P1 or P2
is indeterminate.
• P1UP2: This is the dual part of T since it gives priority to deny. It denies an action when
P1 or P2 denies it and accepts an action when no one of them denies it and at least one
of them accepts it. Otherwise, the policy is either not applicable or indeterminate if P1 or
P2 is indeterminate.
• P1 ‖ P2 denotes the parallel composition of policies. It accepts an action when both
of them accept and denies when both of them deny. Otherwise, the policy is either not
applicable or indeterminate if P1 or P2 is indeterminate.
• P1 + P2 denotes the choice between two policies. It accepts when one of them accept
and no one denies, and denies when one of them denies and no one accepts. Otherwise,
the policy is either not applicable or indeterminate if P1 or P2 is indeterminate.
• P1 − P2 denotes the policy that accepts when P1 accepts and P2 is not applicable and
denies when P1 denies and P2 is not applicable. Otherwise, the policy is either not
applicable or indeterminate if P1 or P2 is indeterminate.
• P1 	 P2. This behaves like P1 − P2 except that the result is indeterminate (“?") when
there is an overlap between P1 and P2 (i.e. the accepts of P1 together with its denies is
not disjoint from the accepts of P2 added to its denies) .
To reduce the number of parentheses when writing properties, we assume the following
precedence between operators (from strong to weak) ¬, p, ., ||, T, U, +. For example P1 +
¬P2.P3||P4 is same as P1 + (((¬P2).P3)||P4). Notice that SePL does not explicitly contain
the composition rules (combining algorithms) used in XACML, but, as we show later that, it is
expressive enough to specify them. Also, the operators of SePL are not independent from each
others. We show later that we can remove many of them without affecting the expressiveness
of the language. In fact, we can keep only the operators belonging to the set {¬, p , ‖,+,	}
without affecting the expressiveness of the language.
7.2. Semantics
• Preliminary definitions: Let A = (α1, . . . , αn) and B = (β1, . . . , βn) be two tuples of
n set elements. In the sequel, we define the following semantic operators:
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A ∪B = (α1 ∪ β1, . . . , αn ∪ βn)
A ∩B = (α1 ∩ β1, . . . , αn ∩ βn)
A−B = (α1 − β1, . . . , αn − βn)
A	B = (α1 	 β1, . . . , αn 	 βn)
Aq = (α1q, . . . , αnq)
pA = (pα1, . . . ,pαn)
where
α	 β = α− ((α ∩ β)∩?)
= α ∩ ((α ∩ β)∩?)
=
{
α if α ∩ β = ∅
? otherwise
pα =
{
α if α 6=?
∅ otherwise
αq =
{
α if α 6=?
D(α) otherwise
p(α ∪ β) = pα ∪ pβ
p(α ∩ β) = pα ∩ pβ
p(α) = αq
(α ∪ β)q = αq ∪ βq
(α ∩ β)q = αq ∩ βq
(α)q = pα
• Absolute Semantics ([[ − ]]): The absolute semantics of a policy P , denoted by [[ P ]]
returns a pair (A,B) whereA is the acceptance domain of P andB is its denying domain.
The domain that is not explicitly accepted or denied by a policy defines implicitly its
“non-applicable" domain. More formally, [[ − ]] is inductively defined as shown by Table
9 where (A1, D1) denotes the semantics of P1, (A2, D2) denotes the semantics of P2 and
(A,D) denotes the semantics of P .
The absolute semantics gives the meaning of a policy independent from the environment
in which it will be evaluated. One of the advantages of this semantics is that any opti-
mization or simplification applied to it can be used for any environment. This means that
we can reduce the time of the evaluation of the semantics by optimizing this semantics
one time and use it many times with different environments. Another advantage is that it
allows to prove some general results independent from a specific environment.
• Relative Semantics ([[ − ]]Γ): The semantics of a policy P relative to an environment
Γ, denoted by [[ P ]]Γ, returns the decision of the policy P regarding Γ. In practice, the
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Table 9: Absolute Semantics
[[ < ϕ1, ϕ2 > ]] = (ϕ1 − ϕ2, ϕ2 − ϕ1)
[[ ε ]] = (⊥,⊥)
[[ 0 ]] = (⊥,>)
[[ 1 ]] = (>,⊥)
[[ ¬P ]] = (D,A)
[[ pP ]] = (pA, pD)
[[ P1 · P2 ]] = (A1 ∪ (A2 −D1), D1 ∪ (D2 −A1))
[[ P1TP2 ]] = (A1 ∪A2, (D1 −A2) ∪ (D2 −A1))
[[ P1UP2 ]] = (A1 −D2 ∪A2 −D1, D1 ∪D2)
[[ P1 ‖ P2 ]] = (A1 ∩A2, D1 ∩D2)
[[ P1 + P2 ]] = ((A1 ∪A2)− (D1 ∪D2), (D1 ∪D2)− (A1 ∪A2))
[[ P1 − P2 ]] = (A1 − (A2 ∪D2), D1 − (A2 ∪D2))
[[ P1 	 P2 ]] = (A1 	 (A2 ∪D2), D1 	 (A2 ∪D2))
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environment Γ contains both the action that we want to execute together with its context
(the values of the variables of the environment during its execution). For our semantics,
the result is (α, β) where {α, β} ⊂ {T, ?,F} (T stands for True, F stands for False, and
? stands for unknown). Usually, the result is considered as permit if α = T, deny if
β = T, otherwise the result is either not applicable or indeterminate. It is non applicable
if α = β = F and it is indeterminate if α and β are in {(F, ?), (?,F), (?, ?)}. More details
about these notations will be given within the section regarding the formalization of the
XACML language.
More formally, let Γ = [a1 = v1, . . . , an = vn] be an environment where vi ∈ D(ai) ∪
{?} and “a =?" means that the value of the attribute a is unknown. Let P be a policy
such that [[ P ]] = (A,D). We extend the definition of [[ − ]], as follows:
[[ P ]]Γ = ([[ A ]]Γ, [[ D ]]Γ)
[[ (d1, . . . , dn) ]]Γ = [[ d1 ]]Γ(a1) ∧ . . . ∧ [[ dn ]]Γ(an)
[[ d ]]Γ(a) =

T if Γ(a) ∈ d or d = D(a)
F if Γ(a) 6∈ d or d = ∅
? otherwise
Notice that the truth tables of the three-valued logic is as shown hereafter:
∧ T ? F
T T ? F
? ? ? F
F F F F
∨ T ? F
T T T T
? T ? ?
F T ? F
	 T ? F
T ? ? T
? ? ? ?
F F F F
b ¬b
T F
? ?
F T
b pb
T T
? F
F F
It is sometimes useful to define [[ − ]]Γ in a compositional way as shown in Table 10
where (a1, d1) denotes [[ P1 ]]Γ, (a2, d2) denotes [[ P1 ]]Γ and (a, d) denotes [[ P ]]Γ:
where a− b denotes a ∧ ¬b
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Table 10: Relative Semantics
[[ < ϕ1, ϕ2 > ]]Γ = ([[ ϕ1 − ϕ2 ]]Γ, [[ ϕ2 − ϕ1 ]]Γ)
[[ ε ]] = (F,F)
[[ 0 ]]Γ = (F,T)
[[ 1 ]]Γ = (T,F)
[[ ¬P ]]Γ = (d, a)
[[ pP ]]Γ = (
pa, pd)
[[ P1 · P2 ]]Γ = (a1 ∨ (a2 − d1), d1 ∨ (d2 − a1))
[[ P1TP2 ]]Γ = (a1 ∨ a2, (d1 − a2) ∨ (d2 − a1))
[[ P1UP2 ]]Γ = (a1 − d2 ∨ a2 − d1, d1 ∨ d2)
[[ P1 ‖ P2 ]]Γ = (a1 ∧ a2, d1 ∧ d2)
[[ P1 + P2 ]]Γ = ((a1 ∨ a2)− (d1 ∨ d2), (d1 ∨ d2)− (a1 ∨ a2))
[[ P1 − P2 ]]Γ = (a1 − (a2 ∨ d2), d1 − (a2 ∨ d2))
[[ P1 	 P2 ]]Γ = (a1 	 (a2 ∨ d2), d1 	 (a2 ∨ d2))
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7.3. Abbreviations
For the sake of making the presentation clear, we adopt the following abbreviations:
1. We use the terms N/A, Permit, Deny, Indeterminate(P), Indeterminate(D), Indeter-
minate(PD) as an abbreviation of the following situations:
N/A = (F,F)
Permit = (T,F) or (T, ?)
Deny = (F,T) or (?,T)
Indeterminate(P) = (?,F)
Indeterminate(D) = (F, ?)
Indeterminate(PD) = (?, ?)
2. We denote by ϕ→ p and ϕ→ d the following policies:
ϕ→ p ≡ (ϕ,⊥)
ϕ→ d ≡ (⊥, ϕ)
3. Any ϕ = (d1, . . . , dn) can be represented by its restricted attributes only. An attribute ai
is restricted in ϕ if di 6= D(ai). For example, if A =< Role,Object,Action > such that
D(Role) = {r1, r2, r3}, D(Object) = {o1, o2, o3, o4} and D(Action) = {a1, a2}, then
we can use the following abbreviation:
•
({r1, r2, r3}, {o1}, {a2})
≡
(Object ∈ {o1},Action ∈ {a2})
≡
(Object = o1,Action = a2)
•
({r1, r2, r3}, {o1}, {a1, a2})
≡
(Object ∈ {o1})
≡
(Object = o1)
4. The order of attributes is not important if their names are present in tuples. For example
(Object = o1,Action = a2) is the same than (Action = a2,Object = o1). Also, we take
this fact into consideration when when we combine two abbreviated tuples. For instance:
(Action = a2,Object = o2) ∪ (Object = o1,Action = a1)
≡
(Action = a2,Object = o2) ∪ (Action = a1,Object = o1)
≡
(Action = a1 or Action = a1,Object = o1 or Object = o2)
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Notice also that () is an abreviation of (D(Role),D(Object,D(Action)) is the list of
attributes is A =< Role,Object,Action >. In this case, it follows:
(Action = a2,Object = o2) ∪ ()
≡
()
and
(Action = a2,Object = o2) ∩ ()
≡
(Action = a2,Object = o2)
5. If op is a binary SePL operator, we denote by op(P1, P2) the prefix notation of P1 op P2.
For example, P1TP2 can be denoted by T(P1, P2). The result can be generalized to n
compositions since all the operators of SePL are transitive. For example, P1TP2T. . . TPn
can be represented by T(P1, P2, . . . , Pn).
6. The policy φ : P is the abbreviation defined inductively as follows:
φ : (φ1, φ2) = (φ ∩ φ1, φ ∩ φ2)
φ : ¬P = ¬(φ : P )
φ :pP = p(φ : P )
φ : (P1 ‖ P2) = (φ : P1) ‖ (φ : P2)
φ : (P1 + P2) = (φ : P1) + (φ : P2)
φ : (P1 	 P2) = (φ : P1)	 (φ : P2)
where φ is the tuple that is complementary to φ. For example, if A =<
Role,Object,Action > such that D(Role) = {r1, r2, r3}, D(Object) = {o1, o2, o3, o4}
and D(Action) = {a1, a2}, then
(Action = a2,Object = o2) = (Action ∈ {a1, a3},Object ∈ {o1, o3},Role ∈ {})
7.4. From XACML to SePL
Table 7.4 outlines a BNF grammar that we propose to capture a significant subset of
XACML-3.0. The literature does not contain such grammar and it is not simple to build it from
XACML-3.0 specification. This will be useful also to automatically build a lexical analyzer and
parser for XACML-3.0 using tools such as Lex and Yacc.
The formalization for rules and policy combining algorithms are as follows:
• Permit-override: Permit-overrides between P1, . . . , Pn, denoted by
POR(P1, . . . , Pn): It accepts if at least one policy accepts and denies if no one
accept and at least one denies. It can be formalized in SePL as follows:
POR(P1, . . . , Pn) ≈ P1T. . . TPn
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Table 11: A BNF Grammar for a Subset of XACML-3.0
PDPpolicies ::= PolicySet | Policy
PolicySet ::= < POLICYSET Pheader > [Description] Targets Policies [Obligation] [Advice] </ POLICYSET >
Policy ::= < POLICY Rheader > [Description] Targets Rules [Obligation] [Advice] </ POLICY >
Policies ::= Policy | Policy Policies
Rules ::= < RULE Rheader > [Description] [Targets] [Condition] [Obligation] [Advice] </ RULE >
PSheader ::= PolicySetId = string Version = number PolicyCombiningAlgId = Palg
Pheader ::= PolicyeId = string Version = number RuleCombiningAlgId = Ralg
Rheader ::= RuleId = string Effect = REffect
Palg ::= only-one-applicable
| Ralg
Ralg ::= deny-overrides
| permit-overrides
| first-applicable
| ordered-permit-overrides
REffect ::= Permit | Deny
Targets ::= < TARGET > [MatchAny] < / TARGET >
MatchAny ::= < AnyOf > matchAll < / AnyOf >
|< AnyOf > matchAll < / AnyOf >MatchAny
MatchAll ::= < AllOf >Matches < / AnyOf >
|< AnyOf >Matches < / AllOf >MatchAll
Matches ::= Match |Match Matches
Match ::= < Match MatchID = MatchId >
< AttrValue > value < / AttrValue >
< AttributeDesignator ADHeader / >
< / Match >
MatchId ::= string-equal
| integer-equal
| string-regexp-match
| integer-greater-than
| . . .
ADHeader ::= Category= Subject AttributeId = AttSubject DataType= type MustBePresent= boolean
| Category= resource AttributeId = AttResource DataType= type MustBePresent= boolean
| Category= action AttributeId = AttAction DataType= type MustBePresent= boolean
| Category= environment AttributeId = AttEnv DataType= type MustBePresent= boolean
Subject ::= access-subject
| recipient-subject
| intermediary-subject
. . .
AttSubject ::= subject-id
| subject-id-qualifier
| key-info
| authentication-time
. . .
AttResource ::= resource-id
| target-namespace
AttAction ::= action-id
| implied-action
| action-namespace
AttEnv ::= current-time
| current-date
| current-dateTime
type ::= x500Name
| rfc822Name
| ipAddress
| dnsName
| xpathExpression
| string
| boolean
| double
| time
| date
| dateTime
| anyURI
| hexBinary
| base64Binary
Condition ::= < Condition > BooleanExpression < / Condition >
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• Deny-overrides: Deny-overrides between P1, . . . , Pn, denoted by DOR(P1, . . . , Pn):
It denies if at least one policy denies and accepts if no one denies and at least one accepts.
It can be formalized in SePL as follows:
DOR(P1, . . . , Pn) ≈ P1U . . .UPn
• First-Applicable: First-Applicable between P1, . . . , Pn, denoted by FA(P1, . . . , Pn): It
accepts if there is at least one policy that accepts and that is not proceeded by a denying
one and vise-versa. It can be formalized in SePL as follows:
FA(P1, . . . , Pn) ≈ P1 . . . Pn
.
• Only-one-applicable: Only-one-applicable between P1, . . . , Pn, denoted by
OOA(P1, . . . , Pn): if more than one policy is applicable, the result will be neither accept
nor deny (without decision). Otherwise, the unique applicable policy will be applied. It
is formalized in SePL as follows:
OOA(P1, . . . , Pn) ≈ (P1	Σni=2Pi) + . . .+ (Pj 	Σni=1,i 6=jPi) + . . .+ (Pn	Σn−1i=1 Pi)
• Deny-unless-permit: Deny-unless-permit between P1, . . . , Pn is formalized in SePL as
follows:
DUP (P1, . . . , Pn) ≈ p(P1T. . . TPn)
• Permit-unless-deny : Permit-unless-deny between P1, . . . , Pn is formalized in SePL as
follows:
DUP (P1, . . . , Pn) ≈ p(P1U . . .UPn)
Now, the transformation function d − e from XACML to SePL can be inductively defined as
shown in Table 7.4. Its definition is based on our own understanding of the XACML-3.0 textual
description. Each rule is dedicated to a specific component (PolicySet, Policy, Rules, etc.) of
XACML-3.0, where bold terms denote terminal words. For example, transforming an XACML
condition (described by "< Condition > BooleanExpression < / Condition >") to
SePL turns to extract the BooleanExpression and ignore the rest.
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Table 12: From XACML-3.0 to SePL
d − e : XACML− 3.0 −→ PSL
(PolicySet) d< POLICYSET Pheader > [Description] Targets Policies [Obligation] [Advice] </ POLICYSET > e
= d Targets e : d Pheader e( d Policies e)
(Policy) d< POLICY Rheader > [Description] Targets Rules [Obligation] [Advice] </ POLICY > e
= d Targets e : d Rheader e(d Rules e)
(Policies) d Policy Policies e = d Policy e, d Policies e
(Rules) d< RULE Rheader > [Description] [Targets] [Condition] [Obligation] [Advice] </ RULE > e
= ([d Targets e] d [Condition] e)d Rheader e
PSheader d PolicySetId = string Version = number PolicyCombiningAlgId = Palg e = d Palg e
(Pheader) d PolicyeId = string Version = number RuleCombiningAlgId = Ralg e = d Ralg e
(Rheader) d RuleId = string Effect = REffect e =→ d REffect e
(Palg) d only-one-applicable e = OOA
d deny-overrides e = DO
d permit-overrides e = PO
d first-applicable e = FA
d ordered-permit-overrides e = OPO
(REffect) d Permit e = p
d Deny e = d
(Targets) d< TARGET > [MatchAny] < / TARGET > e = d [MatchAny] e
(MatchAny) d< AnyOf > matchAll < / AnyOf > e = dmatchAll e
d< AnyOf > matchAll < / AnyOf >MatchAny e = dmatchAll e ∪ dMatchAny e
(MatchAll) d< AllOf >Matches < / AnyOf > e = dMatches e
d< AnyOf >Matches < / AllOf >MatchAll e = dMatches e ∪ dMatchAll e
(Matches) dMatch Matches e = dMatch e ∪ dMatches e
(Match) d< Match MatchID = MatchId >
< AttrValue > value < / AttrValue >
< AttributeDesignator ADHeader / >
< / Match >e
= (MatchId(d ADHeader e, value))
(ADHeader) d Category= Subject AttributeId = AttSubject DataType= type MustBePresent= boolean e = AttSubject
d Category= resource AttributeId = AttResource DataType= type MustBePresent= boolean e = AttResource
d Category= action AttributeId = AttAction DataType= type MustBePresent= boolean e = AttAction
d Category= environment AttributeId = AttEnv DataType= type MustBePresent= boolean e = AttEnv
(Condition) d< Condition > BooleanExpression < / Condition > e = BooleanExpression
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